drove complex systems of levers and rods, which guided the movements of the figures' hands over the page. Robert-Houdin's writer is thought to have been destroyed by a fire in 1865, and so has not been subjected to expert examination, but it seems likely that, in common with other automata built by the great illusionist, it would have combined elements of the sophisticated mechanisms utilized by the Jaquet-Drozes and Maillardet with hidden levers or pedals controlled by a human operator. ii Jessica Riskin locates this difference in the construction of these automata in the context of a shift from an eighteenth-century ethos of simulation (which sought to replicate, as accurately as possible, the mechanics of physiological processes themselves) to a nineteenth-century culture of analogy (which was content with devices that merely presented an outward semblance of such underlying processes). iii As Riskin acknowledges, however, even the device she identifies as the principal embodiment of the philosophy of simulation -Jacques Vaucanson's digesting duck (first exhibited 1738) -employed a crude fraud, rather than the elaborate technological architecture proclaimed by its maker, to achieve its effects (a fraud which was eventually revealed by none other than Robert-Houdin). iv Without discarding Riskin's distinction between simulation and analogy, then, it is nonetheless evident that throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, automatonmakers were united in manipulating the outwardly visible form and function of their machines in order to effect an illusion of interior organic process, irrespective, to some degree at least, of the actual process employed. In the case of the writing automata of the period, the intended illusion, of course, was the uncanny impression that the figures were not simply rehearsing a series of predetermined actions, but independently generating their own writings. Self-evidently, moreover, this illusion was reliant on the convincingly humanoid appearance and behaviour of the writers, while it would have been dispelled by the exposure of the mechanism (of whatever kind) propelling their motions. As a character in E.T.A Hoffmann's 'Die Automaten' (1821) says of an automaton he has observed: 'The outward form … [of the figure] has been cleverly selected. Its shape, appearance, and movements are well adapted to occupy our attention in such a manner that its secrets are preserved and to give us a favourable opinion of the intelligence which gives the answers'. v The impression of autonomous agency thus conveyed could be quite profound. John Tresch has recently charted the varied and ambiguous responses that such devices elicited when they were displayed to the public in theatres and exhibition halls. While some, generally more educated, viewers approached them as amusing novelties or impressive displays of technical ingenuity, others were willing to entertain the notion that they possessed some genuine flash of vitality. vi It is striking, though, that in accounts of public displays of these figures, even the most sober witnesses testify to at least a fleeting illusion of spontaneous creativity. As I have suggested, this effect was dependent on the machines' status as androids (humanoid automata) with anatomically proportionate physiques and naturalistic physiognomies; and this was for two reasons, both of which bear on prevailing models of subjectivity and authorship in the period.
Much discussion surrounds the cultural, philosophical, and aesthetic meanings and associations of these and other, contemporaneous, automata. Simon Schaffer, for example, identifies them as literal embodiments of a tradition of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century European thought that viewed humans as purely mechanical beings, a tradition whose origins lie in René Descartes' philosophy of animal existence, and which, in extending Descartes' claims to humans, reached its culmination in the French Enlightenment materialist ideas of Denis Diderot and, preeminently, Julian Offray de La Mettrie. Its definitive statement is La Mettrie's 1747 treatise Machine Man, with its conclusion that 'man is a machine and … there is in the whole universe only one diversely modified substance'. vii As Riskin emphasizes, though, even the most mechanistic of French Enlightenment philosophies found no contradiction in celebrating humanity's capacity for 'sentiment' and 'sensibility' -for feeling, emotion, passion, and expression; viii the attempts of automaton-makers to employ mechanical means in order to build figures that exhibited all the animation and vitality of human beings was, she suggests, wholly consistent with this outlook.
The importance of a language of sentiment and sensibility throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is, furthermore, just one of many continuities that have led critics and cultural historians to question conventional divisions between Enlightenment and Romantic world-views. ix Over a period exactly contemporaneous with the production of the clockwork writers discussed above, this tradition effloresced into the Romantic discourse of authorship, with its vision of literature as 'fundamentally expressive of a unique individuality' and defined by 'originality' and the 'conscious intention of the autonomous subject'. x Just as Romanticism privileged the expressive capacity of the writer, so, as Christopher Keep argues, the ability of an automaton to write suggests, more strongly than any other function it might possess, the presence not of a program but of a person, one whose actions are the free and spontaneous expressions of some deep reserve of selfhood, an inwardness or depth of being which is capable of reflecting on itself as self. The very appearance of writing … is always marked by the trace or outline of a living presence, the unique individual who is both the source and origin of the enunciative act. xi Vivian Sobchack also interprets these machines, like similar devices now marketed as children's toys, as dramatizing a Romantic conception of authorship through the act of writing -specifically through the act of writing by hand. Handwriting, she remarks, 'is always … auratic insofar as it is enabled not just by a material body but by a lived body that, however regulated, cannot avoid inscribing its singular intentionality in acts and marks of expressive improvisation '. xii The author of Romantic theory is a notoriously contradictory being, however, and if the convincingly anthropomorphous performances of these mechanical writerfigures partake of an expressivist or idealist vision of literary creativity, in which the imagination is granted an autopoietic status, they equally resonate with an empiricist model that stresses the writer's constitutive receptivity to the dynamics of the external world. As Riskin notes, the automaton-makers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not attempt to replicate the action of the five senses; xiii again, though, the verisimilar appearance of their machines succeeded in conveying to viewers an impression of responsiveness and alertness. In the case of the Jaquet-Drozes, even the choice of the figure's footwear (or lack of it) was designed to suggest an acute sensitivity to the environment (see figure 1 ). As Gaby Wood puts it, some inventors intended their objects to be artificial forms of an eighteenthcentury ideal -the child as a blank slate, the purest being. The Jaquet-Droz figures conduct their marvellous activities barefoot, illustrating a belief, held by their contemporary Jean-Jacques Rousseau, that children would learn more freely if unhampered by shoes. xiv As has often been noted, the exemplary synthesis of the expressivist-idealist and empiricist currents in Romantic aesthetics is found in William Wordsworth's 'Tintern Abbey' (1798). xv Wordsworth had no enthusiasm for automata, xvi but his exultant celebration of 'all the mighty world / Of eye and ear, both what they half-create, / And what perceive' (106-08) precisely delineates the spectrum of faculties that the clockwork writers of his day were designed to give the impression of possessing. I will return to Wordsworth's poem later, in light of the connections I now wish to draw between these writer-figures and some recent developments in artificial intelligence research. If, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the writing automaton's humanoid and (partially) mobile construction was technically incidental, and served merely to generate an illusion of sentience and perception, in our own era such material embodiment is increasingly viewed as essential to the creation of genuine artificial intelligence.
Meaning and Embodiment in Machine-Generated Literature
In November 1928, the Franklin Museum in Philadelphia took delivery of the damaged and disassembled components of a brass clockwork machine. The donors, in whose family the device had resided for several generations, understood it to have once been capable of writing messages and drawing pictures, and had some notion of it being the work of the German inventor Johann Nepomuk Maelzel. After an engineer at the Institute had painstakingly repaired the device, it was equipped with a fountain pen and set in motion. It promptly inscribed four drawings and three poems, signing the last with the flourish, 'Ecrit par L'Automate de Maillardet'. xvii This wonderfully eerie story -a signal manifestation of that effect we have come to call the uncanny -perfectly allegorizes the historical dynamic I wish to explore, in which the fidelity of later generations to the embodied form of early clockwork automata permits those figures to address us, with arresting directness, across the centuries.
Riskin notes that the conviction in this earlier moment 'that life, consciousness, and thought were essentially embodied in animal and human machinery has striking parallels in current Artificial Intelligence'. xviii As she observes, the notion that intelligence must be 'physically grounded' is the central principle of the sub-discipline of AI known as artificial life (AL). She cites the pioneering work of Rodney Brooks, director of the Artificial Intelligence Lab at MIT, who 'has left behind the purely software model of AI, and instead builds robots with sensors and feedback loops, giving them vision, hearing, and touch'. xix The idea that, as Susan Blackmore puts it, 'mind can be created only by interacting in real time with a real environment' is of particular significance in the branches of AI that attempt to equip machines with a grasp of language. xx Perhaps the most significant challenge to conventional, box-bound AI programmes in this regard is the argument -made, most influentially, by the philosopher of mind John Searle -that such systems will never possess genuine linguistic ability because they are condemned to an existence that lacks 'intentionality'; that is, while they may be able to follow (and even, with the advent in the 1980s of artificial neural networks, progressively learn or internalize) syntactic rules, they can have no understanding of what the symbols they manipulate according to these rules are 'about', what they signify or refer to, what they mean.
The 'bottom-up' approach advocated by proponents of 'embodied cognition' seeks to redress the problem of intentionality by more closely replicating the processes of human language acquisition:
As human infants develop linguistic competence, they learn not only how to describe objects but also how to describe and express intentional relations such as wants, likes, and dislikes, intentional relations that were experienced by the infant before they could be cast in linguistic form. In this way language and cognition elaborate on previously experienced nonlinguistic and noncognitive (i.e., bodily) intentional relationships. An infant's experiences of noncognitive intentional relationships provide the foundation necessary for the cognitive life it will later enjoy. Human beings do not suffer from the symbol grounding problem … precisely because we are embodied….
By building robots that interact with the environment prior to linguistic competence … an embodied approach to AI provides the necessary foundation for higher cognition. xxi This new paradigm has not so far been extended into the domain of machinegenerated literature. The potential of embodied cognition for this field can be most readily grasped, however, by considering the software-based systems that currently Bringsjord and Ferrucci's BRUTUS produces short stories of up to 500 words using a sophisticated 'story grammar' architecture, which can handle character, setting, plot development, and the other basic elements of prose narrative. The first incarnation of BRUTUS took eight years to develop. Its designers concentrated on equipping the programme with the ability to write stories centred around the theme of betrayal, since this was one aspect of human experience that, they reasoned, could be logically tabulated, in contrast to more diffuse emotional phenomena such as love, fear, or regret. One of BRUTUS' stories, entitled simply 'Betrayal', begins like this:
Dave Striver loved the university. He loved its ivy-covered clocktowers, its ancient and sturdy brick, and its sun-splashed verdant greens and eager youth.
He also loved the fact that the university is free of the stark unforgiving trials of the business world -only this isn't a fact: academia has its own tests, and some are as merciless as any in the marketplace. A prime example is the dissertation defense: to earn the PhD, to become a doctor, one must pass an oral examination on one's dissertation. This was a test Professor Edward Hart Bringsjord and Ferrucci, meanwhile, identify the benchmark of creativity with such giants of the canon as Dickens, Tolstoy, Joyce, Updike, and Morrison (whilst acknowledging that 'if BRUTUS n , some refined descendant of BRUTUS 1 , is to soon find employment at the expense of a human writer, in all likelihood it will be as an author of formulaic romance and mystery' xxix ).
Regardless of the shortcomings of these programmes with respect to their designers' highest ambitions, and whatever we might think of the aesthetic qualities of the writings they produce, it is undeniable that their texts bear at least a passable resemblance to the literary forms they are designed to emulate. As Kathleen L. Komar says of a piece by Kurzweil's poet, 'if we did not know this [the text's mechanical provenance], we would undoubtedly count the poem as literature'. xxx What is equally clear, however (and what I take to be the grounds for Komar's equivocation), is that these programmes remain entirely bound by the problem of intentionality: they may be able to follow rules in such a way as to produce texts that meet the objective criteria for recognition as works of poetry or short fiction, but they have no apprehension of what these texts mean, or even that they could yield such a thing as meaning. The successes and failures of these projects are cast into sharp relief by two celebrated intellectual experiments, which are often hailed as inaugurating, respectively, the disciplines of artificial intelligence and modern literary theory: the eponymous test invented by the computer scientist Alan Turing to determine the existence of machine intelligence, and the experiment in literary response undertaken by the critic I.A. Richards under the banner of 'practical criticism'.
The 'Turing Test', first described in the seminal paper 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence' (1950), consists of a scenario in which a human interrogator poses questions to two concealed interlocutors in an attempt to determine which is a human and which a machine; if the machine can persuade the interrogator that it is the human party, Turing reasoned, then it can be legitimately deemed intelligent. Both the Cybernetic Poet and BRUTUS have been submitted to variations on the Turing Test, in which readers attempted to distinguish the programmes' texts from those by human writers. xxxi The thirteen adults and three children to whom Kurzweil administered his test correctly attributed the poems they read at a rate of 63 per cent and 48 per cent, respectively. xxxii Meanwhile, 25 per cent of the two thousand web visitors who read a piece by BRUTUS alongside four stories by human writers successfully identified the machine-authored text. xxxiii The fact that in these (albeit only semi-scientific) tests readers succeeded in distinguishing between human-and computer-generated writings at a rate not significantly better than chance lends empirical weight to the assertion that the two programmes are capable of imitating the conventions of their assigned genres with a considerable degree of credibility. Paradoxically, however, when the products of these programmes are considered in light of an experiment that insists on curbing considerations of authorial identity in favour of concentrated interpretation of the texts themselves, the irrevocable alterity of their computational originsseemingly elided in these quasi-Turing Tests -reasserts itself.
I.A. Richards' Practical Criticism (1929) describes an initiative undertaken at
Cambridge University in the 1920s, whereby groups of readers, predominantly undergraduates studying English, were issued with poems by a range of authorscontemporary, canonical, and minor -which had been stripped of personally and historically identifying details; the readers were invited to submit written responses or 'protocols' in which they recorded their reflections on these materials. Richards' realisation, on the basis of these often misconceived submissions, that literary criticism needed to develop a considerably more rigorous and systematic methodology prepared the ground for many of the theoretical innovations of the succeeding decades. His pedagogical exclusion of biographical and historical data so as to focus the reader's attention on the words on the page would prove to be particularly significant for the Anglo-American New Critics of the 1940s and '50s. Its Michaels' polemical essay 'Against Theory'. Knapp and Michaels argue that meaning is inextricable from intention: however much material marks may resemble familiar textual signifiers, they cannot be understood as meaningful unless they are intentionally inscribed. They invite the reader to imagine encountering what appear to be lines of poetry etched on the beach: if we count these marks 'as nonintentional effects of mechanical processes (erosion, percolation, etc.)' then to treat them as meaningful would be an invalid projection of agency onto merely contingent phenomena. xxxvii On the basis of this argument, Knapp and Michaels make the bold claim that since there can be no meaning without intention, 'the meaning of a text is simply identical to the author's intended meaning'. xxxviii Given this, 'theory' -by which they mean 'the attempt to govern interpretations of particular texts by appealing to an account of interpretation in general' -is a misguided enterprise that should be abandoned. Though few scholars have been willing to accept Knapp and Michaels' arguments wholesale, it is nonetheless apparent in retrospect that, as Reed Way Dasenbrock remarks, '"Against Theory" and the controversy it generated helped usher in the "post-theoretical" era we now seem to be in' xxxix -'post-theoretical' to the extent, at least, that debates over the appropriate hermeneutic or interpretive protocols for textual analysis no longer have the centrality in critical practice that they once had. In their wake, the prevailing tendency has been away from a text-centred focus on the disentanglement of meaning and towards a re-embedding of those meanings within the kind of extra-textual fields that the New Criticism and the 'high theory' of poststructuralism both, in their different ways, sought to bracket out. A return to history, materiality, referentiality, the experiential, the bodily, and the real is evident across an array of recently emergent or re-invigorated critical movements, ranging from new historicism and cultural materialism to Marxism, postcolonialism, feminism, queer theory, trauma studies, and ecocriticism. Michaels, in particular, has made significant contributions to this contextual or historicist turn in literary studies (most notably his major new historicist work The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism [1987] ), but if the 'After Theory' controversy played a part in paving the way for this shift, it did so more through its challenge to the dominance of a critical paradigm whose interests tended to exclude extra-textual concerns than through any positive endorsement of those concerns themselves; indeed, Knapp and Michaels insist that they make no claims at all 'about what should count as evidence for determining the content of any particular intention' (intention for them, of course, being synonymous with meaning). xl Unexpectedly, the field of embodied cognitionand, more distantly, the clockwork writing automata that so suggestively anticipate its interests -indicate ways in which the argument of 'After Theory' might be extended and modified so as to establish a compelling ontological legitimation for the expanded horizons of recent critical study.
The grounds for this legitimation begin to become clear when one considers how a successor of one of Richards' students might respond if asked to write a 'protocol' on a suitably anonymized text by the Cybernetic Poet or BRUTUS. The reader would no doubt be able to give some account of the basic, literal sense of the piece, and might also succeed in tracing some credible patterns of imagery or paths of thematic development, but, once informed of its origins, they would be likely to feel that the exercise had been in some way profoundly futile. As P.D. Juhl observes, there is 'something odd about interpreting' a 'computer poem'. xli Accordingly, McHale describes the 'resentment' that 'anyone who has introduced [interactive, machinemediated, or machine-generated] poetry to students knows'. xlii Insofar as the function of such avant-gardist strategies is precisely to challenge the reduction of literary reception to a pure matter of determining meaning, McHale's implicit impatience with his students is understandable enough, but, equally, if the urge to decipher familiar, apparently intelligible signs is not simply a convention of certain forms of literary training but an integral element of our very species-being, then the students' resentment is equally excusable. Indeed, to return to the hypothetical example of an exercise in practical criticism being performed on a machine-generated text, the reader's response -which is in this case wholly predicated on the establishment of meaning -would not only feel futile, but would be futile, since it would consist of a mere encounter with the 'nonintentional effects of mechanical processes', xliii from which it is as perverse to read off meaning as it is instinctive to do so.
The Cybernetic Poet, BRUTUS, and other highly 'delegated' systems of machine writing truly are hypostases of Barthes' dead author: thoughtless, affectless, intentionless beings whose arbitrary manipulations of 'tissue[s] of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture' function, as if by magic, to drain these textual fragments of their significatory power. xliv All that remains for their readers is the possibility of a delirious dérive across the smooth surface of the text, in pursuit not of interpretation or decipherment, xlv but of the sheer overwhelming jouissance evoked by the material signifier in its all geometric splendour. Despite the best efforts of Barthes and others -including, most notably, Susan Sontag and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari xlvi -the notion of a genuinely non-interpretive aesthetics remains less a critical programme, however, than an intriguing thought experiment, one which has in fact only served to demonstrate the inherently interpretive character of every critical statement.
Meaning, then, is the uncircumventable object of reading, and meaning, as we have seen, can be guaranteed only by the agency of an intentional being. Of course, the Cybernetic Poet's 'Soul', BRUTUS' 'Betrayal', or Jackson Mac Low's 'Call Me Ishmael' were not, as in Knapp and Michaels' example, engraved on the beach by some cosmically improbable accident. They each originated, instead, in the actions of a programmer or designer, who presumably had some understanding of the rules and symbols he or she selected for mechanical processing, and some aspiration that, once initiated, the programme would combine these materials in such a way as to produce textual outputs intelligible to a human reader. As Kathleen L. Komar remarks with regard to the Cybernetic Poet, 'the initial reading experience' of Kurzweil and his programming colleagues 'informs the programs they write to create new texts that will produce a similar experience for the reader'. xlvii A marginal degree of intentionality, and thus of meaning, can be recuperated in these instances, therefore, but only by appealing to the human agent or agents without whose initiating role no such texts would exist. Why is it, then, that writings by John Donne, Edna St. Vincent To quote Jacques Lacan, it is only from this organic, infantile union with the 'the entirety of things, ... the totality of the real' that the speaker's capacity for linguistic reflection on his condition can emerge, inscribing 'on the plane of the real this other plane, which we here call the plane of the symbolic'. xlix Those modes of literary analysis that attempt to separate literary texts out from the spatio-temporal manifold in which they are situated therefore paradoxically exclude the very phenomena that make meaning, and thus criticism itself, possible.
This being so, the incorporation of these phenomena -whether they be, say, a soaring rock formation, a ruined religious building, the scars carved on the landscape by the rhythms of industrialization, or the violent upheavals on the streets of revolutionary Paris -into our reflections on literary meaning becomes less a matter of preference than of necessity. The state of embodied intentionality that subtends literary meaning demands, then, a wider consideration of the world through and in which this state develops; but the overdetermined nature of the subject's worldlihood rules out any endorsement of Knapp and Michaels' claim (in the face of the anti-intentionalism of the New Criticism and poststructuralism) that the 'the meaning of a text is simply identical to the author's intended meaning'. l If the embeddedness of the human subject in the material conditions of life on earth permits the emergence of its capacity for meaning-making, then, in a recursive movement, it is the privileged manifestation of this capacity -literature -that most powerfully crystallizes these more-or-less contingent and impersonal conditions into meaningful, symbolic form.
Such is the virtually infinite variety of these conditions, however, that this intervention on the part of the writer constitutes the coming into being of a field of semantic potential in which meaning may be almost inexhaustibly sought and found.
The literary act is the performative announcement of an intention to mean, not the inscription of a singular intended meaning.
Prolegomenon to a Robot Literary History
Two days after Geoffrey Jefferson delivered the Lister Oration quoted at the beginning of this essay, in which he cast doubt on the likelihood of a machine ever genuinely replicating the human composition of a sonnet, his colleague at the University of Manchester, Alan Turing, was quoted in The Times as saying, I do not see why it [a computer at the University] should not enter any one of the fields normally covered by the human intellect, and eventually compete on equal terms. I do not think you can even draw the line about sonnets though the comparison is perhaps a little bit unfair because a sonnet written by a machine will be better appreciated by another machine. li By the late 1980s, rudimentary computer-generated poetry was well established. In an essay on a notable early programme, RACTER, Christian Bök speculates that 'the poets of tomorrow are likely to resemble programmers, exalted, not because they can write great poems, but because they can build a small drone out of words to write great poems for us'. He continues: 'What have we to lose by writing poetry for a robotic culture that must inevitably succeed our own?... We may have to consider this heretofore unimagined, but nevertheless prohibited, option: writing poetry for inhuman readers, who do not yet exist, because such aliens, clones, or robots have not yet evolved to read it'. lii Casting an eye towards this far future, Michael L. Johnson which invites us to imagine a future class of specialized 'robot historians' committed to tracing the various technological lineages that gave rise to their species. And we could further imagine that such a robot historian would write a different kind of history than would its human counterpart.... The robot historian ... would hardly be bothered by the fact that it was a human who put the first motor together: for the role of humans would be seen as little more than that of industrious insects pollinating an independent species of machine-flowers that simply did not possess its own reproductive organs during a segment of its evolution. liv As the remarks by Turing, Bök, and Johnson suggest, a robot literary history would likely see human beings and their aesthetic interests as similarly marginal to its narrative. What seems increasingly clear, however, is that information processing machines will only conceivably develop the sentience necessary for a literary culture of their own by escaping the prison of nonintentionality; and their only possibility of achieving this is by emulating humans to the extent, at least, of ceasing to dwell in grey boxes on laboratory desks, and emerging, instead, as embodied creatures free to explore the world they inhabit. Any such literary history would no doubt reserve privileged chapters for the clockwork writers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, whose embodied forms so strikingly anticipate those of their robotic descendents, as well as the literature generators of our own present, which demonstrate the limits of an existing paradigm, and the necessity of new departures.
Both moments also (although, of course, from our robot historian's perspective merely incidentally) cast new light on some central questions in what we will have to learn to call human literary history.
